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Abstract: 
Exploring the intersection of state, religion and ethnicity, this article considers the 
opportunities for individual and collective advancement available to Muslim Gujjars in 
Chamba district of Himachal Pradesh. Following the lives of three prominent members 
of the community - a teacher, a political activist and a Maulvi - it considers their 
respective orientations to the state and their relationships with their fellow Gujjars, to 
illustrate the different ways in which Gujjars have sought to transcend their marginal 
and subordinated position as an ethnic and religious minority. With state promoted 
schemes of affirmative action and reservation offering only limited opportunities for 
social and economic advancement, we see how Gujjars have responded to their 
continued marginalisation, first through political mobilisation as an ethnic group and, 
more recently, through the establishment of Islamic educational institutions and 
association with Tablighi Jama’at. This leads to an evaluation of the emancipatory 
potentials and contradictions of insurgent citizenship when mobilised around specific 
aspects of ethnic and religious identity. Against a backdrop of economic liberalisation 
and accompanying shifts in civil society, I show how the distribution of rewards that 
derive from strategies of assimilation, engagement and withdrawal are structured in 
particular ways including by class and gender.    
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I have written here. 
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Muslim ST Gujjars in Chamba District 
 
Across a wide swathe of the Western Himalayas, nomadic buffalo-herding Gujjars have 
historically moved their animals from low-lying winter pastures up to alpine meadows where 
they spend the summer months. Tracing their origins to Kashmir, Gujjar families began to 
arrive in the Chamba valley towards the end of the nineteenth century. These Gujjars were 
incorporated into the then Princely State of Chamba as subjects of the Chamba Kings and 
claimed rights to graze animals and farm land directly from the Raja. Then, following 
Independence in 1947, the Kingdom was absorbed into the newly created state of Himachal 
Pradesh and the subjects of the Chamba Raja became citizens of a free India. On account of 
their unique culture, language and dress, and the ‘backwardness’ of their traditional nomadic 
occupation, in 1950 Gujjars residing in the newly created Chamba district were granted 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) status. Here it is worth noting that, unusually for a Scheduled Tribe 
community, the Gujjars in Chamba district are uniformly Muslim. This article considers what 
citizenship means for Muslim ST Gujjars in Chamba district and the ways in which 
administrative definitions have interacted with social and economic aspirations to produce 
emancipatory visions for insurgent citizenship. It does so by considering first the limited 
benefits that some Gujjars gained from affirmative action schemes, goes on to suggest that 
political mobilisation among the Gujjars depends on the acceptance of a subordinate ‘tribal’ 
social status, and finally explains why Gujjars are increasingly seeking to benefit from 
association with networks of Islamic religious teaching. In this way, the article delineates the 
potentials and limits for advancement and traces how individual and collective capacities to 
aspire have been mediated with and through the state. 
Tucked away in the far west of the Himachal Pradesh, Chamba district’s developmental 
performance is among the least impressive in the state. Chamba district has comparatively 
low levels of literacy and life expectancy and the lowest income per capita in Himachal 
Pradesh.2 Chamba also has the largest ST population of any of the 12 districts in Himachal 
Pradesh3. Scheduled Tribe families in Chamba are over-represented among those living 
below the poverty line and amongst the poorest of the poor. Two subdivisions of Chamba 
district (Bhamour and Pangi) have been brought together as a Scheduled Area which allows 
them the benefits of a greatly enhanced budget. Because few Gujjars have their permanent 
homes in the subdivisions, the assistance from this tribal sub-plan has gone mainly to Gaddis 
– another agro-pastoralist ST group – that are the majority population of Bharmour.  
The geographical focus of this article takes us away from the tribal sub-district to a group 
of villages lying in the Saal valley about 15km north of the district capital of Chamba town. 
Of the 122 Households (612 individuals) in Badagaon Panchayat4 around 2/3rds are caste-
Hindu (Rajput, Goswami) or Scheduled Caste. The 200 individuals of the remaining 
households5 are classified as Scheduled Tribe – some Gaddi but mostly Gujjar. In terms of 
education and jobs the General population of caste-Hindus and Muslims possess the longest 
 
2 54.1 per cent of households in Chamba District are BPL against an HP average of 23.9 per cent (source: 
Rural Development Department, H.P. Socio-Economic Indicators of Himachal Pradesh, Department of 
Economics and Statistics, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, 2013). 
3 The 2011 census records a ST population of 135,500 in Chamba out of a district population of 519,080; 
the tribal population of H.P. is 392,126 out of a total state population of 6,864,602. (source: Socio-Economic 
Indicators of Himachal Pradesh, Department of Economics and Statistics, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh). 
4 Throughout this article pseudonyms are used for people, organisations and certain places.  
5 Source: Directory of Villages having concentration of Scheduled Tribe Population excluding Scheduled 
Areas in Himachal Pradesh (2011-Census), issued by the Tribal Development Department, Government of 
Himachal Pradesh, Shimla.  
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history of schooling and monopolise employment opportunities in the state and private sector 
(see Axelby in Shah et al.6). In contrast, most of the Gujjar households in Badagaon depend 
upon combinations of small scale agriculture, unskilled manual labour and the keeping of 
buffalo whose milk can be sold. Nearly seven decades after being granted ST status the 
majority of the Gujjar population remain trapped at the bottom of the socio-economic 
hierarchy with only a few having benefitted from state assistance in education and reservation 
of government posts.  
Exploring the intersection of state, religion and ethnicity, this article considers the limited 
possibilities for individual and collective advancement available to Muslim Gujjars in 
Chamba district of Himachal Pradesh. Doing so charts the means through which, against a 
backdrop of economic liberalisation and accompanying shifts in civil society, Gujjars have 
sought to access government services, claim rights, achieve an education, find remunerative 
employment and raise their social status. With state promoted schemes of affirmative action 
and reservation offering only limited opportunities for social and economic advancement, we 
see how Gujjars have responded to their continued marginalisation, first through political 
mobilisation around a limited ethnic identity and, more recently, through the establishment of 
Islamic educational institutions and employment options which by-pass the state. Moving 
beyond political rights and claims to resources, I go on to examine the ways in which Gujjars 
have sought to assert their social equality. Analysing these claims this article seeks to 
articulate the varied and nuanced manner in which poor and disadvantaged Gujjars envisage 
emancipation.7   
This article is structured around the lives of three prominent members of the Gujjar 
community in Badagaon - a teacher, an activist and a Maulvi - to consider their orientation to 
the state, their relationships with their fellow Gujjars, and the contrasting strategies through 
which they have sought to transcend their social and political subordination as an ethnic and 
religious minority. Using the example of an educated and sophisticated high-school teacher, 
the first section looks at ST reservation policies and asks why affirmative action has proved 
limited in reach and impact. Government assistance enabled Allah Ditta to graduate from 
college and become a teacher. Though Allah Ditta considers himself a pace-setter for Gujjar 
development, he now feels estranged from the wider community. The second section shows 
how Gujjars have lost out as affirmative action schemes for education and jobs have become 
politicized. As the President of a Gujjar Community Rights Organisation, social worker Hanif 
 
6 A. Shah, J. Lerche, R. Axelby, D. Benbabaali, B. Donegan, J. Raj and V. Thakur, Ground Down by 
Growth: Tribe, Caste, Class and Inequality in Twenty-First-Century India, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 
2018.  
7 Three recent collections – on affirmative action, political institutionalisation and emancipatory 
development - have shaped the analysis on which my empirical material is grounded. The articles brought 
together by A. Shah and S. Schneiderman (in Focaal—Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 65, 2013) 
demonstrate the value of anthropological approaches to understand the effects of affirmative action policies for 
differentiated citizenship in South Asia. J. Gorringe and Waghmore (eds.) (From the Margins to the 
Mainstream: Institutionalising Minorities in South Asia, Los Angeles, Sage, 2016) consider the results when 
formerly excluded groups are integrated into sociopolitical processes. The various chapters chart the ways by 
which people gain access to institutions and to unpack the consequences of these processes both for the groups 
in question and for the institutions that they enter. Finally, N. Jaoul and A. Shah’s theme section in Focaal—
Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 76, 2016) charts Adivasi and Dalit political pathways in India. 
In his introduction Jaoul states the aim of the collection is to move beyond dominant, statist conception of 
citizenship when looking at the politicization of subaltern classes. Instead ethnographers of ‘insurgent 
citizenship’ among Dalits and Adivasis are able to offer a view of emancipatory alternatives from below to 
illustrate the way political subjectivities are being produced on the ground by confronting, negotiating, but also 
exceeding the state and its policed frameworks (Jaoul, N. ‘Beyond citizenship: Adivasi and Dalit political 
pathways in India’, Focaal – Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 76: 2016, pp. 3-14).  
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is committed to securing the rights and entitlements of Gujjar people. An increasingly 
influential actor in local politics, Hanif seeks to mobilize Gujjars as a disadvantaged and 
marginalized ethnic group. Here we see how, in competition with other ST groups and non-
ST groups, the Gujjars’ lack of political connections and demographic numbers leaves them 
at a disadvantage. A third leading figure in the Gujjar community is Maulvi Zahid - a teacher 
in a newly created Islamic school. Downplaying ‘tribal’ aspects of Gujjar identity to highlight 
their religious beliefs, Zahid preaches the example of the Prophet Mohammed and 
encourages children to go to religious school. The popularity of Zahid’s new madrasa 
demonstrates how many Gujjars are now actively rejecting secular education and reservation 
and instead pursuing alternatives to government welfare schemes that they feel have done 
little to assist their development. This leads to an evaluation of the emancipatory potential of 
insurgent citizenships based upon forwarding particular aspects of ethnic and religious 
identity. Here I show how the distribution of rewards and costs that derive from strategies of 
assimilation, engagement and partial withdrawal are structured in particular ways including 
by class and gender.    
 
Becoming ‘modern’ and leaving tribal identity behind 
 
Casually dressed in slacks and an un-tucked shirt, Allah Ditta is, in many ways a thoroughly 
modern man. Allah Ditta serves me a glass of Coca-Cola in the reception room of his large 
modern house and tells me the story of how through education he was able to transcend his 
beginnings as a member of a Scheduled Tribe in a remote rural area of Himachal Pradesh.  
 
Both of my parents were illiterate but my father was a hardworking and ambitious man. He farmed 
four acres of land and also ran a small business buying things from the town and selling them in the 
village. I have five brothers and my father tried to give an education to each of us. My two elder 
brothers began to be educated in school but did not continue - they could not understand the language 
of the teachers, or the way of teaching or the atmosphere of the school. They were not suited to it. I 
was third. When I joined the school [in 1965] I found it to be very good, the teachers were capable and 
affectionate. One teacher treated the students just like his own children. This was the reason I wanted 
to go to school.8 
 
School suited Allah Ditta and, unlike his brothers9, he continued to attend. After 
completing the village primary school he went on to the High School a few kilometres away. 
The next step in Allah Ditta’s education was to go to the boys’ Senior Secondary School in 
Chamba town – a daily walk of fifteen kilometres each way. Becoming the first person from 
the Gujjar community to matriculate led him on to Chamba College where his high-caste 
Hindu batch-mates recall being surprised at seeing ‘a man from a backward class’ in their 
classroom. Upon graduation Allah Ditta’s father advised him to ‘become a teacher and 
educate the people’. Allah Ditta travelled to Rajasthan to study for a B.Ed. and, on his return 
to Chamba, became a teacher in a Government school. Over the years he was promoted 
several times and eventually reached the status of Principal in a Senior Secondary School. 
When I met him for the first time he had recently retired, an event that was marked with a 
party and the granting of a pension.  
Allah Ditta is a Gujjar and, as such, he is recognized by the State as belonging to the 
administrative category of Scheduled Tribe. Recognising that ‘the weaker sections of the 
people’ were deserving of special care and assistance, the post-independence Constitution of 
 
8 Allah Ditta, interview by author, Chamba, 27 April 2015. 
9 Very few female Gujjars of Allah Ditta’s generation even made it as far as the doorways of a school.  
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India created the official categories of Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST).  
These were to be the basis for a nation-wide system of affirmative action. The criteria for 
establishing a set of people as a Scheduled Tribe were only loosely defined but rested on a 
lack of social, educational and economic development. Official measures to improve the 
position of ST communities were three pronged: first that they should be afforded protection 
though measures to shield against discrimination and punish practices that perpetuate 
inequities; the second set of measures were promotional i.e. ones that specified preferential 
treatment in allocation of jobs and access to higher education as well the reservation of seats 
in the Lok Sabha and in State Legislative Assemblies; thirdly the gap in social and economic 
between SC/STs and other communities was to be bridged with developmental measures and 
resources. The intention was that communities that were economically, politically and 
socially disadvantaged would be promoted into a notional national mainstream. The effect, as 
we shall see, is that group differentiated citizenship works to create ‘institutional incentives 
for the entrenchment of identities, and their reinforcement and hardening’.10 
In many ways Allah Ditta embodies the ideal of ‘social uplift’ that was intended for 
disadvantaged tribal communities. He is educated and worldly, enjoyed his full career in 
government service and, having reached the age of 58, is now entitled to enjoy his retirement. 
Allah Ditta has spent his career with the clear idea that education should lead to the 
betterment of his community: ‘first education then elevation’. This fits in with the view of 
formal education as a vehicle through which the position of previously disadvantaged social 
actors can be improved. Dreze and Sen promote this idea of education as a simple social good 
– increasing the skills base, knowledge, confidence and freedoms of the poor, education is 
promoted as a route out of poverty and into good jobs11. Allah Ditta was among a handful of 
young Gujjar men (notably there were no women among them) who benefitted from 
affirmative action in the 1970s and 1980s to obtain one of the good government jobs – as 
teachers, policemen or administrators - that had previously been the exclusive domain of 
upper-caste Hindus and Muslims. These individuals, however, were the exception.  
In Chamba, as elsewhere, the presence of individuals such as Allah Ditta within state 
institutions does not appear to have translated into overall social and economic upward 
mobility for Gujjars as a group. Why have so few Gujjars followed Allah Ditta in gaining 
educational qualifications and obtaining good government jobs? A number of anthropologists 
have employed Bourdieu’s concept of social capital to show that, in India, the benefits that 
can be extracted from education are largely governed by people’s pre-existing positions 
within systems of social and economic inequality. Whether for low caste Chamars in U.P.12 
or Christian and Hindu Adivasis in Chhattisgarh13, social connections are a prerequisite in 
order for educational capital to be successfully translated into economic capital in the forms 
of jobs. Jeffrey, Jeffery, and Jeffery, describe how higher castes and classes are able to 
deploy ‘money, social resources and cultural capital’ to assist progress through the education 
system and into employment.14 Moving beyond institutional assistance, Higham and Shah 
have shown how in Jharkhand social advantage (or disadvantage) is translated into 
 
10 N. G. Jayal, Citizenship and its Discontents: an Indian history, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
MA, 2013, p. 202. 
11 J. Dreze, and A. Sen, Economic Development and Social Opportunity, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 
1995. 
12 M. Ciotti, ‘In the past we were a bit “Chamar”: education as a self- and community engineering process 
in northern India’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 12(4), 2006, pp. 899–916. 
13 P. Froerer, ‘Education, Inequality and Social Mobility in Central India’, European Journal of 
Development Research, 23, 5, 2011, pp. 695–711. 
14 C. Jeffrey, P. Jeffery, and R. Jeffery, Degrees without Freedom? Education, Masculinities and 
Unemployment in North India, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA., 2008, p. 208. 
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educational advantage (or disadvantage)15. Applying these lessons to Himachal Pradesh we 
can see why, now and in the past, Chamba’s Gujjars have struggled to complete with the 
dominant Rajput and Brahmin families who have two or more generations of experience in 
securing good government jobs. Significant here are the ways by which a lack of cultural 
capital easily translates into forms of stigma. It is common for ‘city-people’ to dismiss 
‘jungli’ rural Gujjars as backward, ignorant and dirty: one college-educated informant 
laughingly told me that Gujjars understand the meaning of school year groups from class 1 to 
class 12 because the difference is linear, but they don’t know the meaning of BA, MA or 
B.Ed. because these are not. On the one side, most Gujjars lack the forms of capital required 
to make a success of education; on the other they suffer from social stigma and 
discrimination for being uneducated.  
And yet, as the example of Allah Ditta shows, some individuals from disadvantaged and 
excluded communities have been able to bridge this divide. Social mobility for Allah Ditta 
and others of his generation depended on not only gaining educational qualifications but on 
also acquiring the kinds of cultural capital which permitted access to new contacts and 
networks of social relations. To become educated, to enter government service and to achieve 
promotion within it, required Allah Ditta to accept and adopt forms of cultural capital 
recognized by the dominant group – the attitudes and attributes, style, taste and wit of the 
cultivated classes.16 In appearance and clothing Allah Ditta wears western-style trousers and 
shirt rather than traditional Gujjar dress of kurta pyjama and waist-coat. His wife, though 
Muslim, is not a Gujjar and her links lie with the town. Assisted by the policies of 
reservation, Allah Ditta was able to advance as an individual by gaining acceptance within 
new social networks and, conforming to the policed framework of the state, becoming a 
model Indian citizen. The price of doing so is that he feels he had to leave his fellow Gujjars 
behind. Though wanting to assist the wider Gujjar community, Allah Ditta feels marginalized 
within it: 
 
they don’t think of me as a person of their group. They think I am something different and don’t listen 
to me. They see I don’t have a beard or wear traditional clothes.... I want to do something for my 
community but they are against me.17  
 
Affirmative action serves to raise beneficiaries up but it also raises them out18. With 
affirmative action conferring education and jobs on individual beneficiaries such programmes 
can work to amplify social divisions and in doing so create new forms of inequality within 
the communities they are intended to assist. Though undoubtedly a success on a personal 
level, Allah Ditta agrees that others will struggle to replicate his achievements:  
 
 
15 R. Higham and A. Shah, ‘Conservative force or contradictory resource? Education and affirmative action 
in Jharkhand, India’, Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 43, 6, 2013, pp. 718-
739. 
16 P. Bourdieu, ‘The School as a Conservative Force? Scholastic and Cultural Inequalities’, in J. Eggleston  
(ed.), Contemporary Research in the Sociology of Education, Methuen, London, 1974, p. 39.  
17 Allah Ditta, interview by author, Chamba, 27 April 2015. 
18 Here Parry’s description of ‘the aristocracy of Satnami labour’ is apposite: ‘distinction is manifest within 
the caste not only in terms of income, but also increasingly in terms of education, consumption patterns and 
styles of life’. J. Parry, ‘Two cheers for reservation: The Satnamis and the steel plant, in R. Guha and J. Parry, 
(eds), Institutions and inequalities: Essays in honour of Andre Béteille, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1999, p. 
155. 
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It was easier to get reserved posts when I was young. Now is the age of competition – if there is one 
post then hundreds of thousands of people will compete for it. And very few are actually selected on 
merit. Only those with political support will get the job. Political support is very necessary.19 
 
Following Independence, Adivasis and Dalits ‘had to be reformed in order to become 
proper citizens’.20 Allah Ditta notes that in his youth his fellow Gujjars were not educated 
enough to vote. In many respects Allah Ditta embodies a dominant, statist conception of 
citizenship in which the state is viewed as progressive, efficient and capable of deploying its 
expertise to act upon and develop backward groups such as the Gujjars. Allah Ditta’s current 
disillusionment suggests a departure from this Weberian ideal – a state that is contemporary 
but not ‘modern’, that is unnecessarily bureaucratic, inefficient and, above all, political. In the 
next section we see how a new generation of Gujjar social activists and politicians have 
understood the relationship between state and people in new and different ways. No longer 
can Adivasis and Dalits expect to be lifted up and transformed into ‘proper citizens’; instead 
Gujjar social activities have entered into dialogue with the state in order to claim from below 
their rights as citizens. 
 
Emphasising the ‘tribal’ to seek advantage from ethnic identity 
  
Hanif Bhai is the President of the Gujjar Community Rights Organisation (GCRO). Like 
Allah Ditta, Hanif Bhai comes from a family that, by virtue of owning good agricultural land, 
can be considered well-off by Gujjar standards. At his father’s insistence Hanif went to 
school and followed in Allah Ditta’s footsteps by attending the Boy’s Senior Secondary 
School in Chamba town. He graduated in 1994. Context is important: two decades Allah 
Ditta’s junior, Hanif Bhai grew up in an India politicized by the Mandal Commission Report, 
the destruction of the Babri Masjid, and the rise of regional parties and identity politics. 
Separated by a generation the two men followed different routes into positions of leadership 
among Gujjars. This is reflected in their very different orientations to the idea of citizenship 
and the ways they expect state action might improve the lives of their community.  
On leaving school Hanif Bhai was hired by a local NGO to work on a programme 
promoting education. This led to further employment on a similar project based in Chamba 
town and funded by an INGO21. Through these schemes Hanif became aware of and inspired 
by ideas of participatory and community-led development. At the same time the reorientation 
of the Indian economy away from the state was opening up space for NGOs and civil society 
activism. Hanif Bhai continues to work as an activist on several fronts including organising 
environmental protests against the creation of hydro-projects in Chamba. However, he is 
most closely associated with the Gujjar Community Rights Organisation (GCRO). The 
GCRO was founded in 1997 with the aim of improving access to central and state 
government programmes for education, health and employment. Hanif explains his role as 
being to act as a bridge between the people and the state. Grassroots campaigns and 
 
19 Allah Ditta, interview by author, Chamba, 27 April 2015. This view echoes Jeffrey and Lerche’s account 
of recruitment to government service being widely viewed as based on corruption rather than merit: C. Jeffrey 
and J. Lerche, ‘Stating the difference: state, discourse and class reproduction in Uttar Pradesh, India’, 
Development and Change, 31 (4), 2000, pp. 857–878. See also S. Corbridge and J. Harriss, Reinventing India. 
Liberalization, Hindu Nationalism and Popular Democracy, Policy Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 217. 
20 Jaoul, ‘Beyond citizenship’, p. 6 
21 For more on NGOs, activists and social movements in Chamba District see K. Gaul, ‘Shifting strategies 
in Environmental Activism in Chamba District of Himachal Pradesh’, Himalaya, the Journal of the Association 
for Nepal and Himalayan Studies, 21, 2, 2001, pp. 70-78. 
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awareness raising camps are held to disseminate knowledge of constitutionally guaranteed 
rights and enable people to claim them.   
Hanif agrees with Allah Ditta that a lack of education is a crucial impediment to the 
Gujjars’ development. He explained that, due to their families’ migratory lifestyles, Gujjar 
children are educationally disadvantaged in comparison with other communities and the 
majority remain uneducated and illiterate.22 Through his work Hanif campaigns for the 
unique position of nomadic Gujjars to be recognized. To this end a number of Gujjar 
community hostels have been established with government support. These hostels allow 
students to continue their studies during the months when their parents take their buffalo up 
to the summer grazing pastures. The hope is that with educational support more Gujjars will 
be able to make the jump into good government jobs.  
But, as we have seen, education alone is not enough. Contemporary development 
interventions that seek to classify populations for affirmative action purposes cannot be seen 
as proceeding simply in a top-down manner. Rather such measures enter into pre-existing 
spaces of ethnic discourse and practice. Asked what would happen if a Gujjar went up for a 
job against an equally well-educated caste-Hindu, ST Gaddi or SC applicant, Hanif replied: 
‘If my son is as good as another candidate then it is difficult for my son to gain the job as we 
have no one in positions of power to help’. Hanif’s comments make clear that the aim of 
affirmative action for Gujjars is now less about allowing individuals to advance on merit (i.e. 
in competition with historically advantaged communities) and more about obtaining a share 
of the government posts allocated to them (i.e. in competition with other segment of the 
SC/ST population). Being a minority ethnic group within the ST category Gujjars are less 
adept at profiting from the political influence and social contacts that other ST and SC groups 
have been able to draw upon to reduce their education disadvantage and economic 
marginalisation23. In Himachal Pradesh 7.5 per cent of government posts are put aside for 
Scheduled Tribe applicants (according to the 2011 Census of India, STs make up 5.7 per cent 
of the population of the state). However, as Hanif pointed out, this puts ST Gujjars in 
competition for a limited number of government jobs with the much larger ST Gaddi and ST 
Pangiwal communities. Furthermore, both of these other two ST groups benefit from being 
represented by Thakur Singh Bharmouri, a Gaddi who is Member of the Legislative 
Assembly for the reserved constituency of Bharmour. Aiming to level what they perceive as 
an unequal playing field, Hanif’s Gujjar Community Rights Organization argues that within 
the ST category a separate percentage of government jobs should be reserved solely for 
Gujjars. Contrasting Allah Ditta with Hanif we can see how, in one generation, affirmative 
action shifted from efforts to reverse ‘backwardness’ by bringing those classified as ST up to 
the level of the general population, to a competition between ST groups for the resources of 
the state. Reservation is here a zero-sum game.  
With regard to efforts to reverse historical discrimination Béteille distinguishes between 
those claims made for a fairer distribution of benefits on behalf of individuals (a ‘meritarian 
principle’ based on equality of opportunity) and those made on behalf of groups (a 
‘compensatory principle’ based on equality of result).24 We have already seen with the case 
of Allah Ditta that efforts to allow individuals to advance on the basis of merit have met with, 
at best, only limited success. What then of efforts to claim a fairer distribution of benefits on 
behalf on groups? Though the intention of reservation was to reduce caste-consciousness by 
 
22 C. Dyer, ‘Formal education and pastoralism in western India: inclusion, or adverse incorporation?’, 
Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 42:2, 2012, pp. 259-281. 
23 For more details see the chapter by Axelby in Shah et al., Ground Down by Growth.  
24 A. Béteille, ‘Distributive Justice and Institutional Well-Being’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 26, 
No.11/12, March, 1991, p. 591-600.  
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drawing historically excluded groups into to a notional nation mainstream, Béteille warned 
that such policies were likely to reinforce rather than undermine caste and ethnic 
consciousness25. Michelutti and Heath describe how, in recent decades, reservation policies 
attached to community entitlements have influenced the ways in which different caste and 
tribal groups see themselves and the ways in which they see others. This, in turn, shapes the 
ways different groups think about and participate in politics.26 The careers of several 
prominent Gujjars have been advanced through the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments 
of 1992 which reserved seats in the bodies of local governance for scheduled caste and 
scheduled tribes. In panchayats such as Badagaon where Gujjars make up a significant 
portion of the electorate, candidates from their community are well placed to win - 
particularly when the rotating reservation of seats designates that the candidate should be ST. 
Pointing to the example of Hanif, many voters stressed the importance when standing for 
election of having a reputation of holding ‘good relations’ with other communities including 
high caste Hindus, non-tribal Muslims and ST Gaddis. Success in politics depends on 
accepting Gujjar identity but not over accentuating it; success also meant actively 
downplaying aspects of Muslim identity. Having been elected to the panchayat council, 
Hanif’s wife Sheena can be included amongst those that hold a leadership position. When a 
seat on the panchayat is reserved for female candidates it is not unusual for a man to advance 
his wife as a formal proxy while he holds the real power. This is not the case with Sheena 
who campaigns alongside Hanif to promote reproductive rights and the education of girl 
children. Sheena explains that Gujjar women did not wear the veil – ‘it is not our tradition’27 
– and played an important role in promoting the interest of the community as a whole.  
Utilising the new political spaces opened up in India since the early 1990s, Hanif Bhai, 
Sheena, and their fellow community leaders work to manage the ‘collectivity-owned 
capital’28  generated by Gujjars in Chamba as a resource to attract state services, resources 
and benefits. While Allah Ditta’s is an example of how citizens are actively made by states, 
the case of Hanif Bhai draws attention to processes by which social movements may enter 
into a dialectical relation with the state in order to challenge its foreclosures and claim the 
rights they believe are due to them. Shani29 writes of citizenship as both an axis in the terms 
of engagement between individuals, social groups and the state, and a mechanism for 
determining how prospective diverse groups should be delimited and what action should 
result from their solidarity. Based on ideals of political equality embedded in the Indian 
constitution, Hanif’s political activism is a means of making claims for the bundle of rights 
and obligations that he understands form the basis of citizenship. Concretely this is done by 
raising awareness about different social policies, advocating to ensure that social protection 
schemes such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(NREGA) are properly implemented, and campaigning for resources to be allocated to 
Chamba’s Gujjar community.  
 
25 A. Béteille, ‘The backward classes and the new social order’, in The Idea of Natural Inequality and other 
Essays, A. Béteille (ed.), Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1983, pp. 83–120. 
26 L. Michelutti and O. Heath, ‘The politics of entitlement: affirmative action and strategic voting in Uttar 
Pradesh, India’, Focaal - Journal of Historical and Global Anthropology, 65, Spring 2013, p. 57. See also 
Corbridge, S., Williams, G., Srivastava, M. et Véron, R. Seeing the State: Governance and governmentality in 
rural India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 13.  
27 Sheena Begum, interview by author, Chamba, 14 January 2015. 
28 Bourdieu, P. The forms of capital. In J. Richardson (ed.) Handbook of Theory and Research for the 
Sociology of Education. New York, Greenwood, 1986, pp. 241-258. 
29 Shani, O. ‘Conceptions of Citizenship in India and the “Muslim Question”’, Modern Asian Studies, 44(1), 
2010, p. 148. 
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Jaoul writes of how ideological encounters between people’s movements and 
governmental politics work to contest state attempts to monopolize the political process, thus 
opening up possibilities ‘for hybrid and creative political cultures of insurgent citizenship’.30 
If the provision of social welfare suggests benefits being handed down from above to passive 
recipients, the reality is of political struggles which work from the bottom-up. Empowerment 
from below requires ‘the mobilisation and assertion of marginal actors which endows them 
with a sense of their own power to effect social change’.31 However, this is an aspiration that 
is easier to make than it is to achieve. Using the example of Hanif Bhai and the Gujjars, the 
remainder of this section considers the politics and limitations of insurgent citizenship’s 
dialectical engagement with the state.  
 Seeking to represent the interests of Adivasi and Dalit communities by engaging with the 
state on their behalf, those individuals who occupy prominent positions in political 
organizations are generally the ones who have already enjoyed a degree of upward mobility. 
In Chamba district Hanif’s position has been strengthened over time through the 
establishment of political links above the level of the panchayat. Promoting the party as pro-
Gujjar at the panchayat level, pro-tribal at the District level, pro-poor at the state level and 
pro-minorities (including Muslims) at the national level, Hanif Bhai successfully mobilises 
the Congress vote in Badagaon. This has allowed him to develop ties to prominent district 
and state level politicians. Gaining political recognition and acceptance is a central goal of 
marginalised groups. However, to view this as an end in itself rather than a step in a longer 
process would be to imbue processes of political representation with more significance than 
they possess.32 Gorringe et al.33 caution against accounts that celebrate the ascension of 
marginal actors to political institutions as a ‘seismic shift’ or a ‘silent revolution’. In doing so 
they warn that the more radical aims of Adivasi and Dalit movements can be diluted as their 
representatives enter into mainstream state and political arenas.  
Hanif Bhai and others like him have succeeded in effectively transforming the social 
identity of Gujjar into an explicitly political identity. Central to the political enterprises 
established by this class of political leaders is the promotion of a notion of Gujjars in Chamba 
as a unified and bounded ethnic group distinct from other communities. Activists skilfully use 
indigeneity discourse to stress Gujjars’ traditional nomadism, their historical exclusion and 
their dependence on the natural resources of the forest. This is clearly effective when 
campaigning for recognition of Gujjars’ access to grazing pastures under the Forest Rights 
Act or seeking compensation for those displaced by the construction of micro hydro-projects 
along the Saal River. Success in these campaigns was possible because Hanif was able to 
mobilise the Gujjars community in ways that did not actively antagonise the wider non-tribal 
population.  
Spanning community service and politics, the work of this new generation of political 
leaders is laudable. However, it is worth asking if the strategic price of gaining improved 
access to some state resources and services has been the institutionalisation of community 
politics and acceptance of an essentialized ‘backwards’ identity for Gujjars. Recognised by 
Parry as ‘the Koli Dilemma’, there is a necessary trade-off between being able to access 
government benefits and the struggle for social prestige34. Making claims on the state does 
 
30 Jaoul, ‘Beyond citizenship’, p. 4. Jaoul borrows the concept of ‘insurgent citizenship’ from Holston’s 
work on political mobilization in Brazil: Holston, J. ‘Insurgent Citizenship in an Era of Global Urban 
Peripheries’, City and Society, 21(2), 2009, pp. 245-267.  
31 Gorringe et al., From the Margins to the Mainstream, p. xxix 
32 Ibid., p. xxiii 
33 Ibid., p. xxvi 
34 J. Parry, ‘The Koli Dilemma’, Contributions to Indian Sociology, 4 (1), 1970, pp. 84-104.  
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little to challenge social stigma and may work to reinforce negative stereotypes of the ‘dirty, 
uneducated, backwards’ Gujjar.35 As such, Gujjars risk being caught in a discursive trap 
which renders them as lesser citizens.36 On the one hand, politicising Gujjars’ ethnic identity 
assists with making claims for government assistance but, on the other, it makes it harder to 
compete with non-ST groups who benefit from their superior cultural capital. Being both a 
Muslim minority in a Hindu state and a socially stigmatised ethnic minority within the ST 
category, the Gujjar dilemma is more challenging than the one that Parry describes the Kolis 
of Kangra as having faced in the 1960s.   
Claims to citizenship can be understood as simultaneously enabling and constraining 
radical projects and popular social movements. Through engagement with the institutional 
bureaucracies of the state, movements that aim to represent the marginalised may find 
themselves pressurised to alter their critiques, demands and practices. 37 As was the case with 
Allah Ditta, so too Gujjar politicians such as Hanif may be incorporated into hierarchies that 
promote their position as community leaders. However, the wider benefits stemming from 
their integration remain partial and limited. As such, movements promoting political equality 
often reinforce the existing political system rather than reforming it.38 Here it is useful to 
make the distinction between political equality and human or social emancipation:  
 
Whereas political emancipation entails granting formal political equality to individuals as citizens of 
their states, human emancipation is about the process through which individuals recognize and 
organize themselves as social beings in their everyday lives. While political emancipation is reached 
when all people within a state are treated as equal by the law of the land, human emancipation is 
realized when people treat themselves and others around them as equals.39  
 
The argument is made that ideologies advocating ‘citizenship for itself’ have the effect of 
sustaining institutionalization processes that paradoxically increase people’s subjection. Real 
advances, it is argued by Jaoul, are in fact promoted by emancipatory struggles whose 
political horizons lie beyond citizenship.40 In the final section we consider a radical 
alternative which Gujjars in Chamba increasingly see as offering the possibility of genuine 
social emancipation.  Drawing on notions of community while not being limited by them, for 
many Gujjars changes in the form of Islam they practice has encouraged their rejection of 
state subjectivities while offering genuine possibilities for education, employment and 
welfare support.  
 
Being Muslim: seeking emancipation outside of the state subjectivities 
 
To open the madrasa they had to close the road. In front of the new classrooms a group of 
VIPs were seated on cushions beneath a covered podium.  Amongst these dignitaries I could 
see Hanif Bhai. Allah Ditta was noticeably absent. In front of the podium a large crowd 
spilled out into the road to listen to the distinguished speakers invited to mark the foundation 
of this new Islamic school: boys in white kurta-pyjama and taqiya (skull caps), girls in black 
headscarves, and Gujjar men wearing turbans, waist-coats and grey kameez. No women were 
 
35 For more on political activism as eco-incarceration see A. Shah, In the Shadows of the State: indigenous 
politics, environmentalism, and insurgency in Jharkhand, India. Duke University Press, 2010. 
36 Gorringe et al., From the Margins to the Mainstream, p. xxviii. 
37 Gorringe et al., From the Margins to the Mainstream, p. xxvi. 
38 Ibid., p. xxvi. 
39 I. Roy, ‘Emancipation as social equality: Subaltern politics in contemporary India’, Focaal, 76, 2016, p. 
16.  
40 Jaoul, Beyond Citizenship, p. 4. 
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present. It was April and the day had started brightly but, as the speeches went on, ominous 
thunderclouds began to build up. When the storm broke we ran inside the classrooms. Lunch 
was provided – a communally cooked dham of biryani, matter paneer and chicken. It was 
here that I met the Maulvi Zahid and he told me about the foundation of the school:   
 
We Gujjars mustn’t confine ourselves to buffalo herding because education is very important. You are 
answerable to God if you don’t educate your children – girls and boys. Our country cannot progress 
and backwardness can’t be eliminated unless Muslim children are educated.  We had to start this 
Madrasa; we couldn’t expect finance from the Government side, instead the money came from our 
own pocket. Two years ago the land was donated and the foundation stone laid at this place. At that 
time it was just a hill and within two years we have built a two storey building.... We have spent 18.5 
lakh rupees but only six lakh rupees are borrowed. People have donated money and labour and 
remained hungry from doing this. We have made this sacrifice so that we will not be questioned by 
God over our children’s lack of education.41 
 
Zahid was understandably busy so I returned the next day when he was free to show me 
the classrooms, the toilet block, the kitchen that cooks the mid-day meal, and the spot where 
a new residential hostel was planned that would allow students to stay full-time. He invited 
me into his office where we drank tea and chatted about his plans for the school. Though his 
smart white kurta, loose pyjamas and skullcap made him look more Delhi-style Muslim than 
tribal Gujjar, Zahid told me he was born in the Saal valley in a house not far from that of 
Hanif. Unlike Hanif he was sent away at the age of eight to be educated at a series of 
madrasas in Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi. As well as studying the Koran he learnt 
Arabic and Islamic Jurisprudence. He could have got a job elsewhere but instead opted to 
return to help his community. Zahid was recruited together with his cousin Roshan Deen to 
be the ‘opening batsmen’ at the new school.   
Jeffrey et al. suggest that with scarce job opportunities, ‘the schooling strategies of 
oppressed people may not follow a simple upward trajectory towards growing participation in 
formal education’.42 When the expected gains from formal education fail to materialize then 
educational strategies ‘may....be subject instead to reassessment and reversal’.43 The opening 
of the new madrasa shows how, in the Gujjar case, investment in education has not 
necessarily been subject to reversal but has undoubtedly been reassessed and has taken on 
new forms. Declining beliefs in the ideals of secular development through education have led 
some to promote religion over ethnicity as a focus of identity and route to social and 
economic advancement. 
Over the last decade a wave of religious feeling has swept through the Saal valley.44 This 
transformation is represented in concrete form by the string of mosques and madrasas that 
have been constructed where before there were none. The roots of this increase in religiosity 
can be traced back to the 1970s. In the years that Allah Ditta was studying for his B.Ed. in 
Rajasthan a small number of other Gujjars (including Zahid’s father) went to Uttar Pradesh to 
gain an Islamic education from madrasas at Deoband and Saharanpur. These men returned 
and passed on what they had learned but their impact, initially at least, was not widespread. 
 
41 Zahid, interview by author, Chamba, 5 April 2015. 
42 Craig Jeffrey, Roger Jeffery and Patricia Jeffery, Degrees without Freedom: The Impact of Formal Education 
on Dalit Young Men in North India’ Development and Change 35, 5, 2004, p. 963-64 
43 Ibid., p. 983 
44 This perhaps mirrors developments in India as a whole where Banerjee (2008: xvi) reports a rise in the 
number of Islamic seminaries and greater emphasis placed on ‘acquiring the outward symbols of Muslim 
identity’. M. Banerjee (ed.), Muslim Portraits: everyday lives in India, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 
Indiana, 2008. 
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While the presence of these Deobandi educated individuals was clearly important, it was not 
until the subsequent generation that the boom in mosque construction took off in the Saal 
valley. The sons of the first Deoband trained elders were also sent to Deobandi seminaries. 
They returned to Chamba a decade after Hanif Bhai made his move into politics through his 
Gujjar Community Rights Organisation. In 2006 a first madrasa was built in the area. 
Families who had not previously sent their children for education enthusiastically signed up 
to help with labour and donations so their children might learn there. The addition of a 
second madrasa, with Zahid as Principal, means that Gujjar children need no longer be sent 
away for religious instruction. Together they can accommodate 250 male and 250 female 
pupils.  
Not everyone appreciated these new madrasas. When Allah Ditta visited one of the newly 
opened madrasa he was shocked by what he saw:  
 
I visited the new Madrasa. I stayed for one hour. I keenly observed the behaviour of the students and 
the teachers. It is not up to standard. It is 100 years old! Gujjars are innocent persons - they are being 
led by everyone... What will they get from these madrasas? Will they be able to earn a living from the 
education given in a Madrasa?45 
 
Allah Ditta is passionate in his belief that secular education is the only path to the 
betterment of the Gujjar community:  
 
Although the government tries to make it easy - stipends are given, money for uniforms, midday meals 
there are no fees - our community has mentality of 100 year back. Gujjaro ke mentality - logic nahi 
hote hai [there is no logic in the Gujjar mentality]. They are too much busy in themselves and don’t 
look outside.46 
 
In his own lifetime Allah Ditta has seen dramatic improvement in education in Himachal 
Pradesh.47 New schools have been built, teachers trained and programmes established that 
have brought the mountain state from being an educational basket-case to being an exemplar 
of the progress that can be made through learning. All communities have made dramatic 
gains in levels of literacy. So why have so many Gujjar families decided to opt out of the 
Government run ‘Hindi’ schools and instead send their children to religious institutions? To 
Allah Ditta madrasas represent no more than a negative retreat away from progress and back 
into faith. Such views are not unique: Jeffery et al.48 and Ahmad49 both relate instances of 
urban, English-educated Muslims accusing madrasas of failing to provide the sort of 
education that equips student to function in a modern, plural society or the skills and 
credentials required in today’s labour markets.50 
In 2006 a high-level parliamentary committee chaired by Chief Justice Rajinder Sachar, 
concluded that India’s Muslims were among the most excluded and alienated members in the 
 
45 Allah Ditta, interview by author, Chamba, 27 April 2015. 
46 Allah Ditta, interview by author, Chamba, 27 April 2015. 
47 See Table 5.3 in J. Dreze and A. Sen, An Uncertain Glory: India and its contradictions, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2013. 
48 ‘Investing in the Future’, p. 76 
49 I. Ahmad, ‘Urdu and Madrasa Education’, Economic and Political Weekly, 37, 24, 15th June 2002, pp. 
2285-87.  
50 Sikand details the commonplace view of madrasas as ‘backwards’, unconcerned with the world around 
them and resistant to change (Y. Sikand, Bastions of the Believers: Madrasas and Islamic Education in India, 
Penguin Books, London, 2005, Ch. 4.) 
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body of the Indian citizenry51. Subjected to pervasive and persistence patterns of 
marginalisation in almost every aspect of their daily lives, the Sachar Committee drew 
comparison between the position of Muslims and that of the scheduled castes and scheduled 
tribes. With religious education weakly linked to state and market52 are the already 
marginalized Gujjars of Chamba district further compromising their socio-economic 
prospects? Turning their backs on secular education are the Gujjars rejecting ideas of 
modernity and progress? On both counts, I would argue not. (With respect to Allah Ditta) a 
degree of logic is in fact clearly apparent in the ways that many Gujjars increasingly identify 
with Islam and choose to send their children to the local madrasa. In this section I shall try to 
define that logic, first with reference to education and the possibilities of economic 
advancement, and then to the potential for religion as a vehicle for social emancipation. 
Instead of simply seeing schools as places where skills are learned we can also understand 
them as sites of discipline which embody societal norms. As such the role of secular 
Government schools should be to provide a sense of national identity and locate students as 
citizens within the wider society. In reality, the stigma which attaches to students from 
‘tribal’ backgrounds leaves many feeling excluded from such places. More recently a 
creeping atmosphere of ‘banal Hinduism’ has arguably contributed to a reluctance of Gujjar 
parents to commit their children (especially girls) to the government ‘Hindi’ schools53. While 
they might have a right to education in government schools this didn’t extend to being able to 
influence the culture or content of the syllabus. Would religious education in madrasas be any 
different?  
I asked Zahid how the popularity of madrasa education can be explained - are they better 
than government schools? ‘Yes – In Hindi school the students would only receive worldly 
education but here we also give moral education plus Urdu and Arabic – apna culture aur 
apni namaaz [our own culture and our own prayer]’.54 A distinction is made between worldly 
education (duniya ki parhai) and religious education (dini talim). If secular education is 
supposed to equip the student to meet the challenges of a changing world (for instance, to 
help with finding employment in a modern economy), madrasas provide guidance on how to 
deal with different cultures, how to overcome moral temptations and deal with the risks that 
accompany modern life. Religious education extends to correct standards of dress, behaviour 
and association or relation with others as well as ideas of doing good and bad. In short, the 
Madrasas and mosques of the Saal valley offer confidence, comfort and a sense of inclusion 
in times of rapid change and uncertainty.  
Religious identity might imbue Gujjars with a sense of collective dignity and confidence 
but the question remains over whether this might be successfully converted into new routes to 
prosperity. A teacher at the neighbouring government school described the curriculum at the 
Madrasa as being ‘purely traditional’ and would, he felt, not equip students for jobs in the 
outside world. When I put this to Zahid he replied that he was inspired by the example of 
‘progressive’ Gujjars in Jammu and Kashmir who were entering the professions – ‘they 
 
51 Sachar Committee Report, Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India, 
Government of India, 2006. 
52 A. Shaban, ‘Muslim Girls in Urdu Medium Schools of Maharashtra Progress, Retention and Aspirations’, 
Economic and Political Weekly, vol. II, no 25, June 18, 2016, pp. 65-70. 
53 For a description of how Muslims in Western UP feel excluded from schools due to the medium of 
instruction, aspects of curriculum, and the practice of teaching being dominated by upper-caste Hindus see P. 
Jeffery, R. Jeffery and C. Jeffrey, ‘Investing in the Future: Education in the Social and Cultural Reproduction of 
Muslims in UP’, in M. Hasan (ed.), Living with Secularism: The Destiny of India’s Muslims, Manohar, New 
Delhi, 2007, pp. 63-90. Sikand (2005, pp. 97-98) also records the suspicions which many Muslim parents hold 
about Government schools. 
54 Zahid, interview by author, Chamba, 5 April 2015. 
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become engineers, doctors or agricultural scientists’. Another retired schoolteacher who now 
helps out in a Madrasa outlined the curriculum as including ‘reading and writing in English, 
Hindi, Urdu and Arabic; religious education because this is very important, and technical 
education so that students might find work in factories after they graduate’. It would be, he 
concluded, ‘a modern Madrasa’ capable of offering a general education in an Islamic 
environment55. Talking to parents who sent their children to the new schools it was apparent 
that they believe that an Islamic education can open up avenues to economic as well as 
religious advancement. Some will go on to pursue further studies in madrasas in UP and 
return, perhaps, as teachers; for others, the dream is of being one day able to journey to ‘Gulf’ 
where the work is plentiful and the remuneration almost unimaginable. We will see later how 
these opportunities are largely restricted to male children. At this point it is enough to 
underline that, with government jobs increasingly hard to reach, many Gujjars view madrasa 
education as offering alternative avenues for mobility which, though narrow, are 
demonstrably achievable. 
Hanif’s activism depends on forwarding claims of Gujjars being a unified and 
homogenous political entity. This is in keeping with the administrative categorisation of 
Gujjars as a scheduled tribe. Such formulations contain, it need not be said, a degree of 
fiction.  Countering simplistic political and administrative definitions, the reality is of 
Chamba’s Gujjars as a set of people who are increasingly economically heterogeneous and 
geographically mobile. Significantly the shift to religious education paralleled the emergence 
of a new class of Gujjar shop-keepers, wholesalers and contractors who have achieved 
success in business. Several of these individuals cut their business teeth as contractors 
supplying labour during the building of the hydro-power schemes in the Saal valley (which 
Hanif had opposed). Serving on governing bodies and contributing to the financing of 
madrasa, these businessmen and their families wield considerable social influence. This is 
most noticeable with regard to their adoption and enthusiastic promotion of the Islamic 
reform movement Tablighi Jama’at.  
In contrast to the government jobs and secular politics that were seen as the exclusive 
domain of the educated elite, many Gujjars expressed the view that it was religion that 
brought all Gujjars together as a community. The establishment of the madrasa showed how 
the diverse elements of the Gujjar community could come together in shared endeavour: a 
landowner donated the site; wealthy businessmen paid for materials and hired specialist 
builders; farmers and buffalo herders – among the least wealthy people in the area – 
volunteered their labour. Those who contributed – whether in cash or kind – explained that 
they were performing a religious duty - zakat or sadqa. Here we see community organised 
around shared religious belief rather than a narrow ethnic identity which is increasingly 
fractured by the opening up of differences in wealth and occupation. The notion of uplift 
which depends on ‘being Muslim’ as well as (or even before) ‘being Gujjar’ is, paradoxically, 
one that increasingly reflects the social activities that brings them together as a group. 
Significantly this is not the kind of notion of the forest-dependent, buffalo-bound, tribal 
Gujjar which Hanif Bhai and his fellow social activists have built their political careers 
around. Here a convincing case can be made that far from turning inward and being ‘too 
much busy in themselves’, the increased religiosity of Chamba Gujjars can be used as 
resources to increase social standing and promote upward economic mobility.56  Central to 
 
55 For an account of the debates over the inclusion of ‘modern’ elements within the curriculum of Deobandi 
madrasas see Sikand, op cit., p. 147.  
56 For more on the Deobandi school see B. Metcalf, ‘The Madrasa at Deoband: A Model for Religious 
Education in Modern India’, Modern Asian Studies, 12, 1978, pp. 111-134. On the Tablighi Jam’at see Y. 
Sikand, The Origins and Development of the Tablighi Jamaat (1920s-1990), Orient Longman, Delhi, 2002.  
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Tablighi learning is the study tour (dawah) which offers Chamba’s Gujjars the chance to visit 
and receive fellow Tablighs throughout India. For Gujjars in Chamba these study tours and 
the education opportunities provided by allied madrasas across North India offer the 
opportunity to build up social networks, to experience new places, open fresh perspectives, 
recognize new opportunities and gain familiarity with possibilities outside of the narrow 
confines of the Chamba valley. And they do so not as subordinates but explicitly as equals. 
Deobandi teaching disseminates a uniform religious ideology that transcends local 
hierarchical social structures to promote common bonds among Muslims. In interviews 
Gujjars stressed that thanks to their madrasa education and Tablighi Jama’at study tours they 
were, for the first time, seen by privileged communities and classes as social equals. This 
observation may only extend to fellow Muslims, but it clearly holds importance to Gujjars 
who have long been made to feel inferior by both Hindus and Muslims in Chamba. 
Cosmopolitanism is no longer the sole preserve of those, such as Allah Ditta and Hanif Bhai, 
whose education has been confined to schools and colleges.  
The democratisation of local state-society relations cannot be adequately understood as 
being propelled simply by an ideational or cognitive transformation. Rather ‘emotions are at 
the very core of mobilization’ and these processes require ‘a transformation on the emotional 
habitus of subaltern groups’.57 Moving beyond the secular politics of ethnicity and caste, 
Mosse58 (for Christianity among South Indian Dalits) and Jaoul59 (for the adoption of 
Navayana Buddhism by Dalits in U.P.) both look at transformatory potential that new forms 
of religion offer to historically subordinated and marginalised communities. The example of 
Gujjars in Chamba suggests similar possibilities through the vehicles of Deobandi Islam and 
association with the Muslim missionary movement Tablighi Jama’at. In this respect, we find 
a moral dimension to aspiration alongside the material one. Subsuming a locally bounded 
ethnic dimension beneath a broader cosmopolitan Muslim identity raises status by shedding 
the notion of the ‘backwards’ Gujjar while imagining new possibilities for advancement. In 
doing so Chamba’s Gujjars challenge the view that progress can only be measured through 
proximity to the state and a narrow ideal of secular education. Where once the secular state 
was seen as the vehicle of modernity, it is now the institutions of Islam which offer the best 
chance of escaping from poverty and the low social status that attaches to tribal identity.  
For adherents of Tablighi Jama’at, in line with the teaching of the original Deoband 
movement, religion becomes ‘a matter of personal, private life, separate from politics’. This 
‘interiorization and individualization of religious practice’ can be constructed as being ‘truly 
secular’.60 In this respect, a movement often see as ‘traditional’ is, in fact, strikingly different: 
‘new in its reach, new in its lay organization, new in its intensity, new in its modes of 
communication and organization, new in its self-consciousness as it deliberately strikes a 
‘counterculture’ relationship to economic and political life’.61 In line with these principles, 
many Gujjars express a feeling of distaste for engaging with the state in order to access 
welfare benefits. Rejecting institutionalization as a backwards tribal community62 they stress 
 
57 A. G. Nilsen, ‘“Real, practical emancipation”?: Subaltern politics and insurgent citizenship in 
contemporary India’, Focaal, 76, 2016, p. 37. 
58 D. Mosse, The saint in the banyan tree: Christianity and caste society in India. Univ of California Press, 
2012. 
59 N. Jaoul, "Citizenship in religious clothing?: Navayana Buddhism and Dalit emancipation in late 1990s 
Uttar Pradesh." Focaal, 76, 2016, pp. 46-68. 
60 B. Metcalf, B. ‘‘Traditionalist’ Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs’, in B. Metcalf, Islamic 
Contestations: Essays on Muslims in India and Pakistan, 2004, p. 275 
61 B. Metcalf, ‘Nationalism, Modernity, and Muslim Identity in India before 1947’, in B. Metcalf, Islamic 
Contestations: Essays on Muslims in India and Pakistan, 2004, p. 178 
62 I. Roy, ‘Emancipation as social equality’, p. 27     
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that Gujjars ‘should not take from the Government’ but instead ‘we should stand on our own 
feet’. However, these feelings do not indicate a sense of outright disaffection towards the 
state nor a rejection of a sense of citizenship.63 Rather they are informed by degrees of 
pragmatism, acceptance and resilience. Though inflected by a healthy degree of cynicism, 
voter participation among Gujjars remain strong – including among those closely associated 
with Tablighi Jama’at64. Returning to the case of the madrasa at Badagaon it is notable that 
grants were obtained from the Panchayat Samiti to support its construction. Furthermore, 
both the Himachal Pradesh State and the National Government contribute to the madrasa by 
covering the cost of some of the teachers’ salaries (under the Scheme for Providing Quality 
Education in Madrasas (SPQEM)). What is notable here is the emergence of a new 
orientation to politics that is national rather than purely local in its emphasis. Making clear 
the rightful claim of India’s Muslims to a full sense of nationality and citizenship, the 
speeches made at the opening of the madrasa emphasised the contribution of Deobandi 
scholars to the freedom struggle.  
Perhaps it would be best to view what is happening among Gujjars in Chamba not as a 
withdrawal from the state but as a reorientation to it: welfare rights and other state 
entitlements are given up, as is the promotion of Gujjars as a separate tribal constituency. 
Rejecting group-differentiated concepts of citizenship, fresh claims are made to a sense of 
identity and belonging in terms of equality within a larger national-civic entity. By engaging 
in an emancipatory struggle whose political horizons lie beyond citizenship, Muslim Gujjars 
feel empowered to negotiate with the state not as tribal supplicants but as full citizens.  
 
The uneven distribution of emancipatory alternatives 
 
As described in the previous section, many Gujjars have, over the last decade, actively sought 
to foreground a Muslim identity that they believe can provide an alternative route to 
economic and social advancement. The new registers of personal and collective identity 
promoted through association with Islamic reform movements such as Tablighi Jama’at 
suggest a decisive shift in – though not necessarily a move away from – notions of Indian 
citizenship among Gujjars in Chamba. The reasons for these shifts are complex – in part they 
this may be due to the sense that there is little benefit in conforming to official acts of 
reductive categorisation, in part because other alternatives are now available that offer 
opportunities for economic and social advancement and, in part, because of the rise of Hindu 
nationalist discourses which reduce identity to a simple binary of belonging. While Hanif 
operates within dominant hierarchies of power (and the possibilities of his activism are 
limited by them), the case of the madrasa shows how the adoption of religious identities have 
liberated Muslim Gujjars in Chamba district to pursue their own interests, define their own 
culture and support their own forms of prayer.  
Relating the Gujjar turn towards religion to possibilities for emancipation from state 
subjectivities throws up a number of questions about the forms and limits of insurgent 
citizenship. With many Gujjars feeling liberated to pursue their own interests we must ask 
how these interests are defined and by whom. As Holston points out, the agendas pursued by 
new forms of social movement are by no means necessarily just, good, or egalitarian.65 Not 
 
63 They share this pragmatic orientation with the Muslim weavers of Varanasi described by P. Williams, 
‘An absent presence: experiences of the ‘welfare state in an Indian Muslim mohallā’, Contemporary South Asia, 
19(3), 2011, pp. 263-280. 
64 One even went so far as to say that a vote for the BJP was ‘a vote for development’ though, he added, the 
benefits would not extend to Muslims.  
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all Gujjars have been able to gain moral and material advantage from the new emphasis 
placed on their identity as Muslims and association with religious education networks. With 
Gujjars ‘tribal’ identity giving way to the ‘Muslim’ one, the distribution of the perceived 
advantages of emancipation outside of the state subjectivities need to be examined.  
In part, the attraction of Deobandi teaching is that it emphasises equality and offers 
connection with Islamic networks across India. It is notable that the religious enthusiasm is 
most evident among the better-off among Chamba’s Gujjar community and particularly the 
emerging class of entrepreneurs who have benefitted most from the liberalisation of the 
economy. For them the opportunities potentially available through integration into India-wide 
business networks are tied up with a sense of social emancipation derived from moving 
beyond the administrative and political subjectivities of tribal identity. Poorer Gujjars are less 
well positioned to enjoy the material or emotional benefits that arise from emphasising 
religious rather than ethnic affiliation. Their dependence on state welfare schemes means they 
also have more to lose. We saw in the example of Allah Ditta that reservation programmes 
intended to bring about equality can result in heightened inequality within the social group. 
Though only a small number of families have benefitted from economic mobility through 
business they are able to exert a disproportionate influence. Newly minted businessmen boast 
of the ‘social work’ they do for the benefit of the wider community. This might take the form 
of giving loans to poor families in times of need, finding jobs for kinsmen without work, or 
funding the construction of mosques and madrasas. In these efforts the new Gujjar elite 
unselfconsciously echo the paternalistic discourses employed by the Nehruvian state as they 
remake the Gujjar community. The interests of the poorest - protection of grazing access and 
a guaranteed right to work as supported by Hanif Bhai and Sheena Begum - risk being 
subsumed beneath the new interests and connects of the emergent middle class. 
If the emancipatory possibilities of insurgent citizenship are shaped by wealth, it is also 
clear that in the Gujjar case the possibilities for individual and collective aspiration are 
heavily gendered. Thus far, Gujjar women have featured only intermittently in this account - 
the three individuals selected as exemplars of particularly trajectories have all been male. The 
first point to make is that - as mediated between the Gujjar community, the wider society and 
the state - the forms of identity that have always prioritised have been ones that 
predominantly privilege men alone. This is not to say, however, that women have not been 
impacted by these trends. In the remainder of this section we examine the gendered basis of 
insurgent citizenship and the ways these shape aspirations among women and men.  
Very few women of Allah Ditta’s generation took advantage of the places in government 
schools that were available to them, and there were none who benefitted from affirmative 
action in terms of the reservation of government jobs. And yet, as Hanif’s wife Sheena 
Begum boasts, Gujjar women have never worn the veil and have traditionally enjoyed a 
comparatively high status and degree of social freedom. When the leadership of Badagaon’s 
panchayat was reserved for a female candidate Sheena won election to the position of 
Pradhan. Sadly, her enthusiastic engagement in social and political activism has brought only 
limited returns mostly in the form of collective mobilisation to promote health care for 
women, birth-control, and campaigns against child marriage. The low enrolment rate for 
female Gujjars in government schools is in stark contrast to popularity of Islamic education.66 
At the madrasa, parents and teachers emphasised the importance of education for girls and 
pointed out that those who previously would not have attended school were now learning to 
read and write. In a couple of cases, female students – both from relatively well-off families - 
had gone on to study at higher level institutions in Surat and Jammu. However, talking to 
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their families it became apparent that resulting opportunities were likely to be constrained by 
the new religious norms of seclusion that formerly many would have considered alien to 
Gujjar cultural traditions. Evidence from studies of Madrasa education – particularly the 
emphasis placed on producing Muslim women who are ‘demure, self-controlled [and] 
respectable’67 - suggests that though girls might have a right to education, they have less of 
the way of rights in or through education. This places Gujjar women on the wrong side of 
three interlocking forms of disadvantage – as part of a minority tribal group, as Muslims 
within a majority Hindu population, and as women within a Muslim community group in 
which the claims to status among men are increasingly related to limits placed on the 
activities of female family-members.  
Discussion of the emancipatory alternatives of insurgent citizenship have allowed us to 
move beyond dominant, statist conception of citizenship. However, the Gujjar example 
illustrates that if such changes may loosen the bonds of state subjectivities and low social 
status for some, they may also condemn others to new forms of marginalisation through the 
remaking of gender relations and growing economic inequality within the social group. For 
wealthy Gujjar men, the benefits of accepting a more cosmopolitan religious identity are 
obvious; but the moral, material and social advantages are less accessible to Gujjar women 
and the poorest of the community. A close examination of the claims of insurgent citizenship 
draws attention to the tensions that arise out of conflicting aspirations, and prompts us to 
consider whose emotions are being mobilized, and to what effect. 
 
Competing visions and vehicles for insurgent citizenship 
 
If India’s nationhood is constructed out of the articulation of different discourses of 
citizenship, then the holding together of the nation-state depends on the degree of legitimacy 
that its diverse citizens confer upon it.68 The possibilities of insurgent citizenship - of how 
ordinary people frame and make demands of the state, how they contest its foreclosures and 
attempt to exceed its bounds - are therefore important in that they make the basis for claims 
for inclusion within the nation and articulate new understandings of the relationship between 
state and citizen.  
This article has shown the complex and sometimes contradictory ways by which 
individuals and social groups have sought to negotiate the shifting plate tectonics of 
citizenship in Himachal Pradesh. In it we have followed the lives and careers of three Gujjars 
in Chamba district who, in different ways, might be seen as leaders of their community. Allah 
Ditta, Hanif and Zahid might be described as outliers, exceptions and pioneers but each 
embodies different visions of identity and possible vehicles of progress. Respectively, they 
owe their positions to official programmes of affirmative action, political activism based on 
ethnic identity, and through incorporation into the education institutions and social networks 
of Deobandi Islam. In pursuit of their ambitions – a secular education and good government 
job, an equitable distribution of state resources and welfare provisions, a sense of social 
emancipation derived from moral status – each has adopted different strategies. For each 
there are tensions between the aspirations of the individual and those of the collective; each 
requires a calculation of the tensions between state subjectivities and emancipatory 
possibilities. These relationships between state and citizen are structured along particular 
lines - the possibilities they offer are shaped by ethnicity, religion, class and gender. In each 
case very real gains can be identified as new opportunities for social and economic 
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advancement have opened up; in each case these gains are unevenly distributed. Each of 
these strategies has allowed Gujjars to access certain facets of citizenship – variously, 
incorporation into a national mainstream, political and civic rights, claims to social welfare, 
extended political ties and feelings of shared belonging - though noticeably each form of 
claim comes without a corresponding denial of other aspects of citizenship.  
Against these emancipatory potentials, the stories of Allah Ditta, Hanif Bhai and Zahid, 
tracked over four decades, also chart a clear closing down of both the range of identities 
through which the state classifies claimants and the associated discourses used to make 
claims on the state. We see this in the decline of the ideal of the secular Nehruvian state 
which established itself with the aim of bringing unity to India’s social and cultural diversity. 
We see it in the rise of identity politics which leaves those lacking political influence as 
losers in the fight over government resources. It is found in the increasing inequality that has 
resulted from the post 1990s liberalisation of the Indian economy. It is also apparent in the 
religious polarisation brought about by the rise of Hindu nationalism. In 1970, Parry 
described the Koli facing a choice between two possible forms of caste identity. Options still 
exist, but four decades on, the Gujjar dilemma is how to avoid being boxed into increasingly 
narrow and prescriptive forms of identity. Behind administrative categories like ‘ST’, ethnic 
categories like Gujjar, or religious categories like Muslim, there exist heterogeneous realities 
that are inflicted with intra and inter-community power relations and conflicts. People’s 
movements that forward claims to political and social emancipation work best when they 
open up possibilities for hybrid and creative political cultures. The potential of Gujjars to 
advance individually and collectively depends on their ability to maintain equitable 
relationships within their own community while constructing mutually supportive alliances 
with other groups of insurgent citizens.   
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